Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Intelligence Coordination and Investigative Processes Related to the Easter Sunday Bombings of 21s...
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Intelligence Coordination and Investigative Processes Related to the Easter Sunday Bombings of 21st April 2019
Submitted to:
His Excellency Ranil Wickremesinghe,
President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
Presidential Secretariat, Colombo 01.
Date:
September 2024
Introduction
The Easter Sunday bombings on April 21, 2019, resulted in a devastating
loss of life and property. The attacks were carried out by eight suicide bombers
linked to a local Islamist extremist group, the National Thowheeth Jama'ath
(NTJ), with ties to ISIS. The bombings targeted churches during Easter services
and luxury hotels in Colombo, killing 269 individuals, including 45 foreign
nationals, and injuring over 500 others.
In response to this national tragedy, a Committee of Inquiry was
established by the Presidential Secretariat in June 2024 to investigate and
report on the intelligence failures leading up to the bombings. The inquiry
also examined another related incident—the killings of two police officers in
Vavunathivu in November 2018, initially thought to be linked to the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but later attributed to the NTJ.
Mandates of the Inquiry
The Committee was tasked with investigating two specific mandates:
1. First Mandate: Whether the State
Intelligence Service (SIS), Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), and other
relevant authorities had prior intelligence on the impending Easter Sunday
attacks and, if so, whether appropriate actions and/or measures were taken to
prevent or mitigate the attacks.
2. Second Mandate: Why the Directorate
of Military Intelligence (DMI) and/or the Criminal Investigation Department
(CID) initially believed that the killings of two police officers in
Vavunathivu on November 30, 2018, were linked to the LTTE, and the findings of
the CID's investigation into the incident.
Key Findings
1. Failures in Intelligence Handling
and Response to the Easter Sunday Attacks
The Committee’s investigation revealed significant failures in
intelligence handling and coordination among key agencies:
State Intelligence Service (SIS): The SIS received credible
intelligence on an impending attack from Indian counterparts on April 4, 2019,
and again on April 20, 2019, a day before the bombings. However, the Director
of SIS, Mr. Nilantha Jayawardena, failed to adequately disseminate this
intelligence to all relevant authorities or take decisive action.
Chief of National Intelligence (CNI): The CNI, Mr. Nandana Mendis, was
informed by the SIS on April 7, 2019, about the threat. However, he did not
take further action to alert or coordinate with other key agencies, including
the police and military. He also failed to review critical WhatsApp messages
from his Indian counterparts, further delaying responses to the threat.
Criminal Investigation Department (CID): The CID failed to
act on the intelligence shared by SIS and did not arrest or monitor key
suspects linked to NTJ, despite being aware of their extremist activities for
years. The CID also relied too heavily on local police and did not conduct an
independent investigation to verify or act on the information.
Police and Security Forces: The Inspector General of Police
(IGP), Pujith Jayasundara, and his deputies were informed of the attack, but
they failed to implement a coordinated security plan. Security measures for key
locations like churches and luxury hotels were not tightened, leading to an
inadequate response on the day of the attack.
The Committee found that although intelligence on the impending attack
was received from Indian agencies, there was a significant delay in acting on
the information due to poor coordination and a lack of proactive measures by
the SIS, CNI, and CID.
2. Misjudged Attribution of the
Vavunathivu Killings
The Committee examined the November 2018 killings of two police officers
in Vavunathivu, initially attributed to the LTTE.
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI): The DMI believed
that the killings were linked to the LTTE based on initial intelligence and
local tensions. However, four months later, the DMI concluded that the killings
were carried out by members of NTJ.
Criminal Investigation Department (CID): The CID initially
concurred with the DMI’s assessment that the killings were carried out by LTTE
operatives. However, the CID failed to investigate further or consider
alternative leads, such as the involvement of the NTJ. This failure to act in a
timely manner delayed the identification of the real perpetrators and allowed
the NTJ to continue planning for the Easter attacks undetected.
3. Ineffective Communication Between
Agencies
One of the critical failures identified by the Committee was the lack of
communication and information sharing between the various intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. Despite multiple opportunities to act on credible
intelligence, key officials did not take decisive actions. Intelligence was
confined to certain individuals, and vital information was not passed on to the
security forces, resulting in a catastrophic failure in preventing the
bombings.
List of Accused, Allegations, and
Recommended Prosecution Charges
1. Nilantha Jayawardena (Former Director, SIS)
Allegations: Jayawardena failed to act on critical intelligence received from Indian agencies about the NTJ’s planned attacks, neglecting to share the intelligence with military forces.
Prosecution Charge: Negligence leading to loss of life under the
Penal Code for failing to take appropriate action to prevent the attacks.
2. Nandana Sisira Mendis (Retired DIG,
Former CNI)
Allegations: As the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), Mendis failed to coordinate intelligence sharing and did not act on urgent warnings about the attacks.
Prosecution Charge: Negligence in duty for failing to share
intelligence and coordinate the response among relevant authorities.
3. Hemasiri Fernando (Former Secretary
of Defense)
Allegations: Fernando did not convey the severity of intelligence reports to the President and Prime Minister and failed to convene critical security meetings.
Prosecution Charge: Criminal negligence for not taking adequate steps
to prevent the attacks despite knowledge of impending threats.
4. Pujith Jayasundara (Retired IGP)
Allegations: Jayasundara’s failure to take proactive steps, including not following up on intelligence reports, contributed to the inability to prevent the attacks.
Prosecution Charge: Failure of duty leading to loss of life, for his lack
of action despite credible intelligence warnings.
5. Nandana Munasinghe (Former Western
Province SDIG)
Allegations: Munasinghe gave general written instructions without following up or planning a coordinated security response.
Prosecution Charge: Negligence in duty, for failing to effectively secure
key locations despite the intelligence received.
6. B.A.E. Prasanna (Former Director,
Western Province Intelligence Bureau)
Allegations: Prasanna failed to mobilize officers or provide sufficient security measures, despite being aware of credible intelligence warnings.
Prosecution Charge: Dereliction of duty, for failing to respond
adequately to the intelligence reports.
7. Lalith Shelton Pathinayake (Former
DIG, Colombo Range)
Allegations: Pathinayake neglected to provide security for vulnerable locations such as St. Anthony's Shrine.
Prosecution Charge: Negligence, for failing to protect key locations
despite receiving warnings.
8. Sanjeewa Bandara (Former SSP, Colombo
North)
Allegations: Bandara failed to increase security or adequately respond to intelligence reports.
Prosecution Charge: Criminal negligence, for his inaction in the face of
intelligence on imminent attacks.
9. D.W.R.B. Seneviratne (Former SDIG,
CID)
Allegations: Seneviratne, head of the CID, failed to arrest NTJ members despite being aware of their actions and involvement in prior incidents, such as the Mawanella statue destruction and Vavunathivu killings. His delayed responses and misjudgments contributed to the failure to prevent the Easter Sunday bombings.
Prosecution Charge: Negligence in duty, for failing to properly
investigate and act on intelligence regarding NTJ's activities, leading to the
attacks.
Reform of Intelligence Agencies: The Committee recommends a
comprehensive review of the operations and mandate of Sri Lanka’s intelligence
agencies. This includes establishing clear protocols for intelligence sharing,
regular coordination between agencies, and a formal structure for reporting and
responding to national security threats.
Improvement of Law Enforcement Training and Preparedness: The Committee urges
the government to improve the training of law enforcement officers,
particularly in handling intelligence and responding to potential terrorist
threats. Regular joint exercises between the police, military, and intelligence
services should be conducted to ensure a coordinated response in times of
crisis.
Review of
Investigative Processes: The Committee recommends a thorough review of the
CID’s investigative processes, particularly in cases involving national
security threats. The reliance on local police and the failure to pursue
alternative leads must be addressed to prevent similar failures in the future.
Strengthening National Security Policy: The Committee calls for the
establishment of a comprehensive national security policy that includes
guidelines for intelligence gathering, sharing, and response. This policy
should be regularly updated to reflect the changing nature of threats and
ensure that all agencies are prepared to act swiftly in the face of danger.
Conclusion
The Easter Sunday bombings were a tragic consequence of systemic
failures in Sri Lanka’s intelligence and security apparatus. Despite multiple
warnings, the lack of decisive action, poor coordination, and miscommunication
between key agencies allowed the NTJ to carry out one of the deadliest
terrorist attacks in the country’s history. The recommendations put forth by
this Committee aim to address these shortcomings and prevent such failures in
the future.
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